Recent studies have shown that Tor onion (hidden) service websites are particularly vulnerable to website ingerprinting attacks due to their limited number and sensitive nature. In this work we present a multi-level feature analysis of onion site ingerprintability, considering three state-of-the-art website ingerprinting methods and 482 Tor onion services, making this the largest analysis of this kind completed on onion services to date.
INTRODUCTION
Website ingerprinting attacks apply supervised classiiers to network traic traces to identify patterns that are unique to a web page. These attacks can circumvent the protection aforded by encryption [7, 13, 19, 25] and the metadata protection of anonymity systems such as Tor [9, 12] . To carry out the attack the adversary irst visits the websites, records the network traic of his own visits, and extracts from it a template or ingerprint for each site. Later, when the victim user connects to the site (possibly through Tor), the adversary observes the victim's traic and compares it to the previously recorded templates, trying to ind a match. Website ingerprinting can be deployed by adversaries with modest resources who have access to the communications between the user and the Tor entry guard. There are many entities in a position to access this communication, including wireless router owners, local network administrators or eavesdroppers, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and Autonomous Systems (ASes), among other network intermediaries.
Despite the high success rates initially reported by website ingerprinting attacks [6, 27] , their practicality in the real-world remains uncertain. A 2014 study showed that the success of the attacks is signiicantly lower in realistic scenarios than what is reported by evaluations done under artiicial laboratory conditions [15] . Moreover, using a very large world of websites, Panchenko et al. showed that website ingerprinting attacks do not scale to the size of the Web [21] , meaning that, in practice, it is very hard for an adversary to use this attack to recover the browsing history of a Tor user. Kwon et al. demonstrated , however, that a website ingerprinting adversary can reliably distinguish onion service connections from other Tor connections [17] . This substantially reduces the number of sites to consider when only targeting onion services, as the universe of onion services is orders of magnitude smaller than the web, which makes website ingerprinting attacks potentially efective in practice. In addition, onion services are used to host sensitive content such as whistleblowing platforms and activist blogs, making website ingerprinting attacks on this sites particularly attractive, and potentially very damaging [8] . For these reasons, we focus our analysis on onion services rather than the whole web.
In this work we choose to model the set of onion services as a closed world. Our dataset contains as many landing pages of the hidden service world as was possible for us to collect at the time.
After removing pages with errors and pages that are duplicates of other sites, we were left with a sanitized dataset of 482 out of the 1,363 onion services that were crawled. While the exact size of the complete onion service world cannot be known with certainty, onionscan was able to ind 4,400 onion services on their latest scan (this number is not sanitized for faulty or duplicated sites) [18] . This indicates that our set, while incomplete, contains a signiicant portion of the onion service world. We consider that an actual attacker can compile an exhaustive list of onion services, which would efectively yield a closed world scenario, since, once the adversary establishes that a user is visiting a onion service, the onion service in question will be one on the adversary's list. We note that closed world models are not realistic when considering the entire web, rather than just onion services.
Prior evaluations of website ingerprinting attacks and defenses report aggregate metrics such as average classiier accuracy. However, we ind that some websites have signiicantly more distinctive ingerprints than others across classiiers, and that average metrics such as overall classiier accuracy cannot capture this diversity.
In this work, we study what we call the ingerprintability of websites and investigate what makes a page more vulnerable to website ingerprinting. This issue has practical relevance because adversaries interested in identifying visits to a particularly sensitive site may not care about the accuracy of the classiier for other sites, and thus the ingerprintability of that speciic site matters. Similarly, the administrators of onion services likely care more about the vulnerability of their users to ingerprinting attacks, rather than the average vulnerability of a onion services to the attack. We extract lessons from our analysis to provide recommendations to onion service designers to better protect their sites against website ingerprinting attacks, including an analysis of a high proile SecureDrop instance.
The contributions of this study are: Large .onion study. 1 We collected the largest dataset of onion services for website ingerprinting to date and evaluated the performance of three state-of-the-art classiiers in successfully identifying onion service sites. For comparison, previous studies considered worlds of 30 [11] or 50 [8, 17] onion services, an order of magnitude smaller than our study, that analyses 482 onion services.
Fingerprintability matters. While the average accuracy achieved by the classiiers is 80%, we found that some sites are consistently misclassiied by all of the methods tested in this work, while others are consistently identiied correctly, and yet others provide mixed results. In particular, 47% of sites in our data set are classiied with greater than 95% accuracy, while 16% of sites were classiied with less than 50% accuracy. Throughout this paper, we use the term ingerprintable to mean how many of the visits are correctly classiied. Depending on the requirements of the speciic analysis, we use diferent ways to distinguish more and less ingerprintable sites. This includes comparing top 50 sites to bottom 50 sites or taking sites with F 1 < 0.33 as less ingerprintable and sites with F 1 > 0.66 as more ingerprintable.
Errors made by diferent methods are correlated. Fully 31% of misclassiied instances were misclassiied by all three classiiers.
This implies that weaknesses of the individual classiiers cannot be fully overcome using ensemble methods. We nonetheless propose an ensemble that combines all three classiiers, slightly improving the results ofered by the best individual classiier.
Novel feature analysis method. We present a method for analyzing ingerprintability that considers the relationship between the inter-class variance and intra-class variance of features across sites. The results of this analysis explain which features make a site ingerprintable, independently of the classiier used.
Size matters. We show that size-based features are the most important in identifying websites and that when sites are misclassiied, they are typically confused with sites of comparable size. We show that large sites are consistently classiied with high accuracy.
Dynamism matters for small sites. While large sites are very ingerprintable, some small sites are harder than others to classify. We ind that misclassiied small sites tend to have more variance, and that features related to size variability are more distinguishing in sets of small sites. Put simply, smaller sites that change the most between visits are the hardest to identify.
Analysis of site-level features. Site-level features are website design features that cannot be (directly) observed in the encrypted stream of traic but can be tweaked by the onion service operators. We identify which site-level features inluence ingerprintability and we provide insights into how onion services can be made more robust against website ingerprinting attacks.
Insights for Adversarial Learning. Website ingerprinting is a dynamic, adversarial learning problem in which the attacker aims to classify a traic trace and the defender aims to camoulage it, by inducing misclassiications or poisoning the learning system. In the parlance of adversarial learning [2] , we have conducted an exploratory attack against three diferent approaches, to help site owners and the Tor network design better causative attacks. A causative attack is an attack against a machine learning system that manipulates the training data of a classiier. Most adversarial learning approaches in the literature consider the adversary to be the evader of the learning system, not the learner. However, this is not the case in website ingerprinting nor in many other privacy problems. For this reason, most adversarial learning studies investigate an attack on a speciic learning algorithm and feature set. In contrast, we study the three top-performing learners and introduce a classiier-independent feature analysis method to study the learnability of a particular class (a web page).
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Encryption alone does not hide source and destination IP addresses, which can reveal the identities of the users and visited website. Anonymous communications systems such as Tor [9] route communications through multiple relays, concealing the destination server's address from network adversaries. Moreover, Tor supports onion services which can be reached through Tor while concealing the location and network address of the server.
Website ingerprinting is a traic analysis attack that allows an attacker to recover the browsing history of a user from encrypted and anonymized streams. Prior work has studied the efectiveness of this attack on HTTPS [7] , encrypted web proxies [13, 25] , OpenSSH [19] , VPNs [12] , and various anonymity systems such as Tor and JAP [12] . links extracted from Twitter. They conclude that website ingerprinting does not scale to such large dataset, as classiication errors increase with the size of the world.
k-Fingerprinting (k-FP) [11] : Hayes and Danezis's k-FP attack is based on Random Forests (RF). Random Forests are ensembles of decision trees that are randomized and averaged to reduce overitting. In the open-world, they use the leafs of the random forest to encode websites. This allows them to represent websites in function of the outputs of the random forest, capturing the relative distance to pages that individual trees have confused with the input page. The instances extracted from the random forest are then fed into a k-NN classiier for the actual classiication. The study uses a set of 175 features that includes variations of features in the literature as well as timing features such as the number of packets per second. Hayes and Danezis evaluated the attack on a limited set of 30 onion services and obtained 90% classiication accuracy [11] .
In the following subsection we provide an overview of prior results on features that has inspired the feature selection made by these three attacks.
Feature analysis for website ingerprinting
We consider two types of features: network-level and site-level features. Network-level features are extracted from the stream of TCP packets and are the typical features used in website ingerprinting attacks. Site-level features are related to the web design of the site. These features are not available in the network traic meta-data, but the adversary still has access to them by downloading the site.
Most website ingerprinting feature analyses have focused on network-level features and have evaluated their relevance for a speciic classiier [5, 10, 22] . In particular, Hayes and Danezis [11] perform an extensive feature analysis by compiling a comprehensive list of features from the website ingerprinting literature as well as designing new features. In order to evaluate the importance of a feature and rank it, they used the random forest classiier on which their attack is based.
Unlike prior work, our network-level feature analysis is classiierindependent, as we measure the statistical variance of features among instances of the same website (intra-class variance) and among instances of diferent websites (inter-class variance).
Website ingerprinting defenses
Dyer et al. presented BuFLO, a defense that delays real messages and adds dummy messages to make the traic look constant-rate, thus concealing the features that website ingerprinting attacks exploit. They conclude that coarse-grained features such as page load duration and total size are expensive to hide with BuFLO and can still be used to distinguish websites [10] .
There have been attempts to improve BuFLO and optimize the padding at the end of the page download to hide the total size of the page [4, 6] . These defenses however incur high latency overheads that make them unsuitable for Tor. To avoid introducing delays, a website ingerprinting defense based solely on adding dummy messages was proposed by Juarez et al. [16] . These defenses aim at crafting padding to obfuscate distinguishing features exploited by the attack. Instead, we look at sites and examine what makes them more or less ingerprintable.
There are defenses speciically designed for Tor that operate at the application layer [8, 20, 23] . However, these defenses do not account either for feature analyses that can help optimize the defense strategy. Our study is the irst to analyze the features at both the website and network layers. Based on our results, we discuss ways to reduce the ingerprintability of onion service sites and inform the design of server and client-side website ingerprinting defenses without requiring any changes to the Tor protocol itself.
DATA COLLECTION AND PROCESSING
We used the onion service list ofered by ahmia.fi, a search engine that indexes onion services. We irst downloaded a list of 1,363 onion service websites and found that only 790 of them were online using a shell script based on torsocks. We crawled the homepage of the 790 online onion services.
Prior research on website ingerprinting collected traic data by grouping visits to pages into batches, visiting every page a number of times each batch [15, 27] . All visits in a batch used the same Tor instance but Tor was restarted and its proile wiped between batches, so that visits from diferent batches would never use the same circuit. The batches were used as cross-validation folds in the evaluation of the classiier, as having instances collected under the same circuit in both training and test sets gives an unfair advantage to the attacker [15, 27] .
In this study, we used the same methodology to collect data, except that we restarted Tor on every visit to avoid using the same circuit to download the same page multiple times. We ran the crawl on a cloud based Linux machine from a data center in the US in July 2016. The crawl took 14 days to complete which allowed us to take several snapshots of each onion service in time.
We used Tor Browser version 6.0.1 in combination with Selenium browser automation library 2 . For each visit, we collected network traic, HTML source code of the landing page, and HTTP requestresponse headers. We also saved a screenshot of each page.
We captured the network traic traces using the dumpcap 3 command line tool. After each visit, we iltered out packets that were not destined to the Tor guard node IP addresses. Before each visit, we downloaded and processed the Tor network consensus with Stem 4 to get the list of current guard IP addresses.
The HTML source code of the index page was retrieved using Selenium's page_source property. The source code and screenshots are used to extract site-level features, detect connection errors and duplicate sites. The HTTP requests and response headers are stored using a custom Firefox browser add-on. The add-on intercepted all HTTP requests, including the dynamically generated ones, using the nsIObserverService of Firefox 5 .
Finally, we collected the logs generated by Tor Browser binary and Tor controller logs by redirecting Tor Browser's process output to a log ile.
Processing crawl data
We ran several post-processing scripts to make sure the crawl data was useful for analysis.
Remove ofline sites. Analyzing the collected crawl data, we removed 573 sites as they were found to be oline during the crawl.
Remove failed visits. We have also removed 14481 visits that failed due to connection errors, possibly because some onion sites have intermittent uptime and are reachable temporarily.
Outlier removal. We used Panchenko et al.'s outlier removal strategy to exclude packet captures of uncommon sizes compared to other visits to the same site [21] . This resulted in the removal of 5264 visits.
Duplicate removal. By comparing page title, screenshot and source code of diferent onion services, we found that some onion service websites are served on multiple .onion addresses. We eliminated 159 duplicate sites by removing all copies of the site but one.
Threshold by instances per website. After removing outliers and errored visits, we had an unequal number of instances across diferent websites. Since the number of training instances can afect classiier accuracy, we set all websites to have the same number of instances. Most datasets in the literature have between 40 and 100 instances per website and several evaluations have shown that the accuracy saturates after 40 instances [21, 27] . We set the threshold at 70 instances which is within the range of number of instances used in the prior work. Choosing a greater number of instances would dramatically decrease the inal number of websites in the dataset. We removed 84 sites for not having a suicient number of instances and removed 9,344 extra instances.
Feature Extraction. Following the data sanitization steps outlined above, we extract features used by the three classiiers. Further, we extract site level features using the HTML source, screenshot, HTTP requests and responses. Site level features are explained in Section 6.
In the end, the dataset we used had 70 instances for 482 diferent onion sites.
ANALYSIS OF WEBSITE CLASSIFICATION ERRORS
This section presents an in-depth analysis of the successes and failures of the three state-of-the-art website ingerprinting methods. This analysis helps identify which pages are the most ingerprintable and which are more likely to confuse the classiiers, giving insight into the nature of the errors produced by the classiiers.
Classiier Accuracy
Even though the classiication problem is not binary, we binarize the problem by using a one-vs-rest binary problem for each site: a True Positive (TP) is an instance that has been correctly classiied and False Positive (FP) and False Negative (FN) are both errors with respect to a ixed site w; a FP is an instance of another site that has been classiied as w; a FN is an instance of w that has been classiied as another site.
In the closed world we measure the accuracy using the F1-Score (F1). The F1-Score is a complete accuracy measure because it takes into account both Recall (TPR) and Precision (PPV). More precisely, the F1-Score is the harmonic mean of Precision and Recall: if either is zero, the F1-Score is zero as well, and only when both achieve their maximum value, the F1-Score does so too.
Note that there are the same total number of FPs and FNs, since a FP of w y that actually belongs to w x is at the same time a FN of w x . Thus, in the closed world the total F1-Score equals both Precision and Recall. However, when we focus on a particular site, the FP and FN for that site are not necessarily the same (see Table 2 ). We have applied the classiiers to our dataset of 482 onion services and evaluated the classiication using 10-fold cross-validation. Cross-validation is a standard statistical method to evaluate whether the classiier generalizes for instances that it has not been trained on. In most cases, ten is the recommended number of folds in the machine learning literature and the standard in prior website ingerprinting work. The results for each classiier are summarized in Table 1 where we report the total number of TPs and FPs and the average accuracy obtained in the 10-fold cross-validation. Thus, we note that using TPR as an accuracy metric is sound in the closed world but, in the open world, TPR is a partial measure of accuracy, as it does not take into account Precision.
As we see in Table 1 , while CUMUL and k-FP achieve similar accuracies, the k-NN-based attack is the least accurate. Even though these results are in line with other studies on website ingerprinting for onion services [8] , we found some discrepancies with other evaluations in the literature. For 50 sites, Hayes and Danezis obtain over 90% accuracy with k-FP [11] , and Kwon et al. obtained 97% with k-NN [17] . However, for the same number of sites and even more instances per site, our evaluations of k-FP and k-NN only achieve 80% maximum accuracy. Since our results show that some sites are more ingerprintable than others, we believe the particular choice of websites may account for this diference: we randomly picked 50 sites from our set of 482 sites and even though Kwon et al. also used onion URLs from ahmia.i, they do not explain how they picked the URLs for their evaluation.
Classiier Variance
In order to determine which features cause a site to be ingerprintable, we look into two types of sites: i) sites that are easy to ingerprint, i.e., sites that consistently cause the least amount of errors across all classiiers; and ii) sites that are diicult to ingerprint, namely sites that are most frequently misclassiied across all three classiiers. In the following sections, we compare the features of these two types of sites and look for evidence that explains their diferent degree of ingerprintability. In our analysis, we evaluated the accuracy for each website in isolation and ranked all the websites to ind a threshold that divides them into the two types described above. We found that only 10 (in kNN) to 40 (in CUMUL) sites are perfectly classiied, while the other sites have at least one misclassiied instance ś some of them are consistently misclassiied by all three classiiers.
We have compared the misclassiications of all three attacks to ind sites that are misclassiied by all the classiiers as opposed to sites that at least one of identiied correctly. Table 2 shows the top ive onion services ranked by number of misclassiications, where we see a partial overlap of which sites are misclassiied the most. This means there is not only variation across websites within a given classiier but also across diferent classiiers. Figure 2 shows a scaled Venn diagram of the classiication errors. The circles represent the errors made by each of the classiiers, and the intersections represent the fraction of instances misclassiied by the overlapping classiiers. All numbers in the Venn diagram add to one as each number is a fraction of all misclassiications, not a fraction of the misclassiications for a speciic classiier. This is to represent how misclassiications are distributed over classiiers and intersections of classiiers. The black region in the center represents the errors that are common to all three classiiers, which accounts for 31% of all classiication errors. This large intersection indicates that classiication errors for a given website are correlated and not independent for each classiier. Note that if the errors were independent, the adversary would beneit from employing multiple website ingerprinting classiiers; but the correlation suggests that such gains will have limited returns. The diagram in Figure 2 does not take into account whether the classiiers that erred predicted the same mistaken label or not. In The intersections contain instances that were incorrectly classiied with exactly the same label by the overlapping classiiers. Only 2% of the errors were misclassiied to the same incorrect site by all three methods, while 85% were misclassiied diferently by each method, showing that the methods do err in diferent ways. Figure 3 , we depict the Venn diagram of misclassiications according to the (erroneous) guessed label. The percentage of instances that were mislabeled in the same way by all three classiiers is substantially smaller: only 2% of the errors are errors that all three classiiers erred with the same predicted label. Interestingly, this small intersection implies that even though these classiiers err on the same instances (Figure 3 ), they do so in diferent ways, making diferent predictions for a given instance. size of the page, this shows that most of the misclassiied pages were confused with pages of similar size. Furthermore, as shown by the histograms most of the misclassiications occur on pages of small sizes, conirming the hypothesis that large pages are easier to identify. We also measure the deviation of each instance from its class mean. We use Z-score, which indicates the number of standard deviations a sample is away from the mean. The Z-score is a standard statistic that normalizes the deviation from the mean using the class' standard deviation. Unlike the standard deviation, this allows to compare Z-scores between classes with standard deviations that difer by orders of magnitude. This property is suited to our case because the sites in our set have large diferences in terms of the total incoming packet sizes.
Comparison of Website Classiication Errors
On the left side of Figure 6 we plot the density for the deviation from the median for the total incoming packet size feature. Z-score values around the origin correspond to low-deviation, whereas values far from the origin correspond to high-deviation. We observe that the correctly classiied instances are more concentrated in the center, while the misclassiied instances are more concentrated in the extremes. This conirms that the instances with higher deviation from their class mean are more likely to be misclassiied.
The right subigure in Figure 6 shows the number of correctly and erroneously classiied instances for the 1, 755 outliers found in our dataset. We used the Tukey's method for outlier removal based on the inter-quartile range and the irst and third quartiles to identify outliers. The bar plot shows that an outlier is three times more likely to be misclassiied (1, 327) than correctly classiied (428). An instance is counted as misclassiied if it is misclassiied by at least one of the classiiers. Figure 6 suggests that variation within a class such as that produced by web page dynamism can be beneicial to induce confusions with other pages.
Confusion graph
Confusion matrices have been used in prior website ingerprinting literature to visualize and help understand the nature of confusions [11, 21] . However, for a multi-class problem of size 482, the confusion matrix is too large for any visualization to be useful. This can be addressed by using confusion graphs instead, which represent misclassiications as a directed graph [29] .
To better understand the nature of classiication errors we draw a directed graph where nodes represent classes (onion services) and edges represent misclassiications. Source and target nodes of an edge represent true and predicted sites, respectively. The edge weight encodes the misclassiication frequency (i.e., number of times the source class is misclassiied as the target class). We have created a confusion graph for CUMUL, which is the best performing classiier in our dataset, shown in Figure 10 in the Appendix.
The nodes are colored based on the community they belong to, which is determined by the Louvain community detection algorithm [3] , as implemented in the Gephi graph software. Node size is drawn proportional to the node degree. We observe highly connected communities on the top left, and the right which suggests clusters of onion services which are commonly confused as each other. Further, we notice several node pairs that are commonly classiied as each other, forming ellipses.
The mean outdegree and indegree of the graph is 4.9, meaning that, on average, a site is misclassiied as 5 distinct sites and confused with 5 distinct sites. The onion service with the maximum outdegree had 42 outgoing edges, meaning it is misclassiied as 42 distinct sites. The onion service with the maximum indegree had 28 incoming edges, meaning it is confused with as many diferent sites. Interestingly, the same onion service has zero outdegree, i.e., its instances are never misclassiied as belonging to another site.
We have looked into the size of the sites for each community in the graph. The sites in the dark green community at the bottom of the graph are all of similar size and signiicantly larger than all the others, explaining why they are confused between each other and clustered into a community. For the other communities, however, it is not obvious which common features deine the community. Further, we discovered that a few of the pairs of sites that form ellipses are false negatives of our duplicates detection in the data cleansing step, while the others require further analysis. We leave a more detailed graph-based analysis of these communities for future work.
We analyze three cases of the symmetry of classiications:
• Symmetrical: Site A is misclassiied as other sites and other sites are misclassiied as Site A. • Asymmetrical: One or more sites are misclassiied as Site A, but A is consistently classiied as A. • Asymmetrical: Site A is misclassiied as one or more other sites, but other sites are rarely misclassiied as A.
For each distinct misclassiication pair (A → B) we check whether there is a symmetric misclassiication (B → A). The total number of misclassiications with symmetric counterparts:
• CUMUL: 74.8% (4868/6502) • kFP: 73,4% (5517/7519) • kNN: 80.6% (8174/10132) The results show the majority of the misclassiications are symmetrical, meaning that there are sets of pages that provide cover for each other, efectively forming anonymity sets . This suggests that onion services may beneit from designing their site to have features that enable them to join one of those sets.
in each direction and 100 interpolation points of the cumulative sum of packet lengths (with direction). We calculate the inter and intraclass variance for each of these features. The direct size features are the most important to classiication (Table 3 ). We found that the interpolated features are more predictive at the end of the trace than the beginning, with the minimum relative diference (0.37) being from the very irst interpolated feature and then increasing to the greatest relative diference (1.51) being the last interpolated feature from the very end of the trace.
Feature Name
Relative Table 3 : Network-Level Feature Variance Analysis for CU-MUL Method. These features had a higher relative diference than most of the interpolated features and alone are great predictors.
k-fingerprinting.
The next group of features we look at come from the k-ingerprinting attack. The features used in the k-ingerprinting attack are more varied as well as more straightforward than those in CUMUL. They include not only features that give information about the size and number of packets, but also the timing of the packets. The features with the highest inter-class to intra-class variance ratio are shown in Table 4 .
The feature analysis we present here is similar to the original analysis presented with the method by the authors, but without the use of any classiication technique. Further, we also look at which features are more predictive for small sites, as we see that misclassiications are much more common for smaller sites. Table 4 shows that features correlated to the total size of a site (e.g. # of outgoing packets) have the highest relative diference and thus are among the top features. This result is consistent with the analysis done by Hayes and Danezis [11] on the same set of features.
When only smaller sites are analyzed however, standard deviation features become important. In Section 4, we show that large sites are easily identiied, and the fact that size features are very predictive is not at all unexpected. However, that standard deviation features are top features for the smaller sites implies that the dynamism of the site makes a diference, as small dynamic sites are generally the least ingerprintable.
kNN. The last set of features are those of the kNN attack.
Like with the other classiiers, we ind that the most important features are those that relate to the size of the traic low. In this case, we ind that almost all of the top predictive features (with the highest relative diference) are related to łpacket orderingž ś which in practice acts as proxy for the size of the low.
The packet ordering feature is computed as follows: for each outgoing packet o i , feature f i is the total count of all packets sent or received before it. Essentially, these features measure the ordering of incoming and outgoing packets.Note that not all sites, however, have the same number of outgoing packets. Therefore if the end of the number of outgoing packets is less than some n (we use n = 500 to be consistent with the original implementation), the rest of the features are illed in with zero or null values. Similarly, some sites may have over n outgoing packets. If this is the case, the packets over the n t h packet are ignored. Similar to the features used in CUMUL, we observed that the later features in this sequence are more important, this is because for most sites (size < n) they are zero and thus these features are a proxy for the total size of the site. The only other feature-type with high relative diference between inter and intra-class variance is the number of packets (1.96), a direct measure of the size of the site.
SITE-LEVEL FEATURE ANALYSIS
In website ingerprinting attacks, the adversary records the network traic between a user and Tor, and analyzes its features to identify the site that was visited. Network-level features and their relative contribution to ingerprintability are, however, not informative for onion service designers who may want to craft their site to be robust against website ingerprinting attacks. To gain insight into which design choices make sites vulnerable to attacks, and how websites can be designed with increased security, we need to look at the features at a site-level.
In this section we investigate which site-level features correlate with more and less ingerprintable sites. Site-level features are those that can be extracted from a web page itself, not from the traic trace. Driven by adversarial learning, we investigate the task of causing misclassiications for any set of network-level features and any classiication method. This information can help sites design their web pages for low ingerprintability, and also assist in developing more efective server-side defenses.
Methodology
Site-level features are extracted and stored by our data collection framework as explained in Section 3. The list of all site-level features considered can be found in Table 6 (in the Appendix).
We build a random forest regressor that classiies easy-and hardto-ingerprint sites, using the ingerprintability scores (the F1 scores from the ensemble classiier described in Section 4) as labels,
IMPLICATIONS FOR ONION SERVICE DESIGN
Overall, our analysis showed that most onion services are highly vulnerable to website ingerprinting attacks. Additionally, we found that larger sites are more susceptible to website ingerprinting attacks. Larger sites were more likely to be perfectly classiied by all attacks while many smaller sites were able to evade the same attacks by inducing misclassiications.
We also observed that the small sites that are harder to identify also have a high standard deviations for many site-level and network-level features, implying that dynamism plays a role in why these sites are less identiiable. While our results show that small size is necessary, it is not suicient. As a result, our recommendation for onion service designers is łmake it small and dynamic. ž
Most website ingerprinting defenses rely on some form of padding, that is, adding spurious traic and therefore increasing the download size. Our analysis, however, shows that this type of defense may not be robust when features such as download size become sparse. Often, these defenses are tested against a single attack with a single feature set and a speciic classiication algorithm. We see, though, that classiication errors do not always coincide for different attacks, and argue that any website ingerprinting defense needs to be tested against a range of state-of-the-art attacks, preferably relying on diferent algorithms and feature sets, in order to provide more general guarantees of its efectiveness.
As a case study, we consider the results that our ensemble classiier achieved in identifying SecureDrop sites. These sites are onion services that are running the SecureDrop software, a whistleblower submission system that allows journalists and media publishers to protect the identities of their sources. Given the sensitive nature of the service that they provide and the nation-state adversaries that they may realistically face, these SecureDrop sites have strong anonymity requirements.
Our dataset contained a SecureDrop site owned by 'Project On Gov't Oversight' (POGO) 6 . The SecureDrop site had an F1-Score of 99%, meaning that it is much more vulnerable to website ingerprinting attacks than the average onion service site.
There were other SecureDrop sites present in our initial dataset, associated with The New Yorker, The Intercept and ExposeFacts. These sites were lagged as duplicates of the POGO SecureDrop site and thus removed during the data processing stage. Since they were identiied as duplicates, all these SecureDrop sites have very similar characteristics and can thus be expected to be identiiable at a similarly high rates as the POGO site. In particular, we noted that these pages embed images and use scripts and CSS styles that make them large and therefore distinguishable.
It can be argued that the existence of various similar SecureDrop sites creates an anonymity set and makes some sites cover up for each other. On the other hand however, it may be enough for the adversary to ascertain that the user is visiting a SecureDrop site for the anonymity of the source to be compromised.
We did a small, manual analysis of some of the most and least ingerprintable sites (by F1 score) to see if there were any strong correlations with content. We found that pages at the bottom end of
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
With 482 onion sites, this is the largest website ingerprinting study of onion service sites. Even so, our results may not be representative of the entire onion service universe. We made our best efort to collect as many onion service URLs as possible using ahmia.fi. While there are more efective methods to collect .onion addresses, such as setting up a snooping Hidden Service Directory [24] , they are ethically questionable.
Our data is a snapshot of the onion services space over 14 days. As the onion services change constantly, and ingerprintability depends not just on individual sites but the whole set, the dataset and the analysis should be updated regularly for a diagnosis of current levels of ingerprintability.
As new website ingerprinting attacks are proposed, features that are important to ingerprintability now may become less so, especially if defenses are introduced or if the design of websites changes. The methods introduced in this paper for extracting features and understanding what makes certain sites identiiable, however, are a lasting and relevant contribution. In particular, we argue that the efectiveness of a proposed defense should be examined not only on average, but that it should account for possible disparate impact on diferent sites depending on their features. For example, even if a defense signiicantly lowers the average accuracy of a website ingerprinting attack, it could be that certain sites are always correctly identiied, and thus left unprotected by the defense. We also point out that we focus on whether a site blends well with other sites, triggering frequent misclassiications in the context of website ingerprinting attacks, and that the efectiveness of using such techniques as basis for defending against website ingerprinting, has dependencies on the actions taken by other onion services.
Our data collection methodology follows standard experimental practices in the website ingerprinting literature when crawling only home pages. On the one hand, limiting the evaluation to home pages (rather than including all inner pages of a site) reduces the classiication space and gives an advantage to the adversary compared to considering that users may directly browse to the inner pages of a site. We argue that a fraction of users will still irst land on the homepage of a site before visiting inner pages and thus this adversarial advantage is not unrealistic. We also note that the link structure of inner pages in a website can be exploited to improve the accuracy of website ingerprinting attacks.
Compared to using wget, curl or headless browsers, our Tor Browser based crawler better impersonates a real browser, limiting the risk of diferential treatment by onion services. Still, it is possible detect the presence of Selenium based automation using JavaScript.
The adversary can sanitize training data by taking measures such as removing outliers, but cannot do so for test data. Since we measure an upper bound for the ingerprintability of websites, we sanitize the whole dataset including the test data. Note that this is in line with the methodology employed in prior work [21, 27] .
We acknowledge that redesigning a site to be small and dynamic, as suggested best practice by our analysis, may not be an option for some sites for a variety of reasons. This is a limitation of our approach to countermeasures, but might be a limitation to website ingerprinting defenses in general, as large sites are easily identiied by website ingerprinting attacks. However, we believe that our results can inform the design of application-layer defenses that alter websites in order to perturb site-level features [8] . This would allow to optimize existing application-layer defenses by focusing on the features that our site-level feature analysis has identiied as most identifying, thus reducing the performance that these defenses incur in Tor.
Previous studies on website ingerprinting have shown that data collected from regular sites get stale over time, namely, the accuracy of the attack drops if the classiier is trained on outdated data [15] . For onion services, Kwon et al. did a similar experiment and showed that onion services change at a lower rate than regular sites and do not get stale as quick [17] . For this reason, in this paper, we assume the adversary can keep an updated database of website ingerprinting templates.
Reducing the accuracy of website ingerprinting attacks can be framed as an adversarial learning problem. A webpage can be redesigned to modify its site-level features (especially those that contribute the most to ingerprintability) to trick the classiier into making a misclassiication. In future work we plan to tackle inding eicient ways to altering these website features to launch poisoning attacks against website ingerprinting classiiers [14] under constraints such as bandwidth, latency and availability.
Finally, we acknowledge that the random forest regression method to determine the ingerprintability of a webpage given only weblevel features is currently useful only for feature analysis. This is due to a number of factors, such as removing the middle of the spectrum sites and balancing the priors. Although there are a few challenges and limitations, creating an accurate tool that can determine if a site will be easily ingerprinted from only site-level features would be very valuable to onion services.
CONCLUSION
Our work intends to change the way that we build and analyze website ingerprinting attacks and defenses, and difers from previous website ingerprinting contributions in several ways. We do not propose a new attack algorithm (with the exception, perhaps, of the ensemble method) or an explicit defense, but study instead what makes certain sites more or less vulnerable to the attack. We examine which types of features, with intentional generality, are common in sites vulnerable to website ingerprinting attacks.
This type of analysis is valuable for onion service operators and for designers of website ingerprinting defenses. A website ingerprinting countermeasure may have a very disparate impact on diferent sites, which is not apparent if only average accuracies are taken into consideration. Further, we note that from the perspective of an onion service provider, overall accuracies do not matter, only whether a particular defense will protect their site and their users.
Our results can guide the designers and operators of onion services as to how to make their own sites less easily ingerprintable, in particular considering the results of the feature analyses and misclassiications. For example, we show that the larger sites are reliably more identiiable, while the hardest to identify tend to be small and dynamic.
This work is also a contribution to adversarial machine learning. Most work in adversarial learning focuses on attacking a speciic algorithm and feature set, but in many privacy problems this model does not it. Our study investigates methods to force the misclassiication of an instance regardless of the learning method. Table 6 shows the site-level features and statistic used to aggregate each site-level features within a site class. We followed the feature extraction step outlined in Section 3 to obtain the site-level features. Here we present a more detailed overview of feature extraction for diferent site-level feature families. Figure 10 : Confusion graph for the CUMUL classiier drawn by Gephi software using the methodology explained in Section 4.6.
A SITE LEVEL FEATURES
Nodes are colored based on the community they belong to, which is determined by the Louvain community detection algorithm [3] . Node size is drawn proportional to the node degree, that is, bigger node means lower classiication accuracy. We observe highly connected communities on the top left, and the right which suggests clusters of onion services which are commonly confused as each other. Further, we notice several node pairs that are commonly classiied as each other, forming ellipses.
